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4Introduction
”The Magna Charta of international refugee law…did not
deliberately omit persecution on gender…it was not even
considered.”1
In 1989, Cynthia Enloe asked the subversive question: “Where are the women?”
in her groundbreaking work on gender and international relations.2 Her work
forms part of an attempt at a reconstruction by feminist scholars who seek to
make visible both “women” and different kinds of masculinity and femininity
necessary “to make the world go round”.3 The question has become known as
“the woman question” and has continued to be asked in many other areas where
women have been invisible for too long.4
This paper applies the same feminist methodology, i.e. it consciously seeks to
place women and their experiences into the framework of human rights law and
refugee law. Refugee law is especially interesting from a gendered perspective,
as women constitute a majority of the refugees in the world.5 However, as most
refugees are fleeing hunger and poverty, they are disqualified from the definition
in the 1951 Refugee Convention6, which limits the notion to specific cases of
persecution. Some would argue that the historical focus on civil and political
rights in international law is a consequence of the gender bias that flows through
the historical development of human rights.7
There are circumstances which give rise to women’s fear of persecution, that are
unique to women. However, the existing bank of jurisprudence on the meaning of
persecution is based on, for the most part, the experiences of male claimants.
Aside from a few cases of rape, the definition has not widely been applied to
                                                
1 Judith Kumin, commenting on the fact that gender is not enumerated among the grounds of
persecution in the 1951 Refugee Convention, cited on UNHCR’s webpage
<http://www.unhcr.org> (2000-11-23).
2 Cynthia Enloe, ”Bananas, Beaches and Bases”, University of California Press, Berkeley and
Los Angeles, California, 1989,  at 7.
3 Jan Jindy Pettman, “Worlding Women, a Feminist International Politics, Routledge, Australia,
1996, at ix.
4 That it is still a highly relevant question can be illustrated with the following sample. In 2001, a
female Swedish journalist wrote a book describing her experiences during the wars in the
Balkans. Commenting the book, a high ranking (male) Swedish military writes “ … It feels a bit
strange for an officer, that it is a woman that describes this world, the most male of worlds, the
every- day-life of war, so thoroughly and with such insight” (author’s translation). Apparently, this
man has over-looked the fact that women are very much involved in the every-day-life, in
particular as part of the civilian population.
5 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 39 (XXXVI) on Refugee Women and International
Protection. UN Doc. HRC/IP/2/Rev. 1986 (July 8, 1985).
6 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951:189 UNTS 137.
7 E.g. Charlotte Bunch, ”Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist perspective”, Women’s
Rights, Human Rights, Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, 1995 Routledge, Great Britain, at 14.
5such female-specific experiences, as genital mutilation, bride-burning, forced
marriages, domestic violence, forced abortion, or compulsory sterilisation.8
As Maja Kirilova Eriksson has pointed out, the division of international law in
human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law can be classified as a result of
traditional fragmentary thinking. As a consequence, certain “grey” zones have
appeared in the international legal framework to the disadvantage of women.9 A
feminist methodology must, therefore, strive for a more holistic approach, which
this paper tries to by using ideas and concepts from a number of different
disciplines, ranging from international relations and international law to
philosophy and psychology.
The paper is divided into three parts,
q The first part describes the feminist methodology and to some degree
also different forms of feminism. It describes certain terms and areas that
have been and continue to be vital to the feminist legal discourse. This
approach aims to give a fuller picture and understanding to the
mechanisms behind the issues that are being treated in the other two
parts.
q The second part looks closer at international refugee law, making use of
the feminist methodology as described in the first part. In particular, it
examines the fact that gender is absent from the enumerated grounds of
persecution in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the consequences of
this omission.
q Finally, the third part studies refugee law and practice at the domestic
level, where the example of Sweden serves as a case study. In 1997, a
new article was introduced in the Swedish Aliens Act, which aimed to
inter alia encompass cases of gender-based persecution as a basis for
granting asylum. The third part applies the methodology and the theories
elaborated in the preceding parts, to the Swedish legislation and its
practical application.
                                                
8 Audrey Macklin, “Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories”, Human Rights Quarterly
17 (1995) 213-277, at 225.
9 Maja Kirilova Eriksson, ”Att gå på två ben eller ett, betraktelsesätt på mänskliga rättigheter”,
Feminstiskt perspektiv 1/00, 5 –12, at 9.
6PART 1    METHODOLOGY AND NOTIONS
1.1. Feminist jurisprudence
The appearance of autonomy in law is maintained by a methodological
framework called “legal reasoning”, which purports to derive objective rules and
principles. However, as this “objectivity” is based on a presumption in which the
male role has been taken as a norm for society as a whole, there is a gender
bias embedded in the policies and structures that stem out from traditional legal
thinking. For this reason, feminist critiques of law have centred on how legal
discourse through its expertise and organisation has served to silence voices of
experience of women.10 Feminist jurisprudence has focused on the ways law
legitimises, maintains, and serves the distribution of power in society. Catherine
MacKinnon has defined it as ”…an examination of the relationship between law
and society from the point of view of all women.”11 Some feminists have
adopted the metaphor “gender lenses” to describe an approach to feminist
analysis which brings into view the different dimensions of power and gender
inequality.12 In that regard it has links to “critical legal studies”.13
Feminist jurisprudence thus consists of two discrete projects;
q The first is to unmask and critique the patriarchy behind purportedly
ungendered law.
q The second step consists of what can be called “reconstructive
jurisprudence”.
For strategic reasons, many feministic law reforms during the last twenty years,
have often been achieved by categorising women’s injuries as analogous to, if
not identical with, injuries men suffer. This can, however, be seen as a
misconceptualisation as it maintains the original presumptions and does not
challenge the basis for these presumptions.  Instead, reconstructive feminist
jurisprudence should set itself the task of reconceptualising new rights in such a
way as to reveal, rather than conceal their origin in women’s distinctive
existential and material state of being.14 With regards to refugee law, this may
translate into the discussion concerning the scope of the five grounds for
persecution in the 1951 Refugee Convention. The fundamental question here is
                                                
10 Celina Romany “State Responsibility goes Private” in Human Rights of Women, National and
International Perspectives, ed. Rebecca J.Cook, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, 85-
115, at 88.
11 Quoted in Heather Ruth Wishik, “To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist
Jurisprudence” in Feminist Legal Theory, Foundations, Ed. D. Kelly Weisberg, Temple
University Press, Philadelphia, 1993, 22-31, at 22.
12 Jill Steans, “Gender and International Relations”, Polity Press, 1998, at 4.
13 Wishik, supra note 11, at 22.
14 Robin West, ”Jurisprudence and Gender”, in Feminist Legal Theory, Foundations, Ed. D. Kelly
Weisberg, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993, 75-98, at 88.
7whether women’s experiences can be interpreted so that they may be included
into the already existing grounds or whether it is necessary to add a sixth ground
(gender), in order to encompass all forms of gender-based persecution.
Heather Ruth Wishik has expressed the purpose of feminist jurisprudence as:
“We risk promoting women’s oppression if we attempt only to
change the law and its impacts on women’s lives and neglect to ask
the questions suggested by feminist jurisprudence. Without such
inquiries, reforms which may appear positive due to their short-term
availability to ameliorate women’s oppression may strengthen
patriarchy in the long run. Feminist jurisprudence can help enable
women to see such dual effects and to make conscious decisions
about whether or which way to proceed.”15
This insight has gained ground also beyond the feminist circles as the Council of
Europe has stated that:
“There is a growing awareness that gender has to be considered
also at a political and institutional level.…Gender is not only a
socially constructed definition of women and men, it is a socially
constructed definition of the relationship between the sexes. This
construction contains an unequal power relationship with male
domination and female subordination in most spheres of life. Men
and their tasks, roles, functions and values contributed to them are
valued—in many aspects—higher than women and what is
associated with them. It is increasingly recognised that society is
characterised by this male bias. Policies and structures often
unintentionally reproduce gender inequality.”16
In order to avoid continuing existing bias it is necessary to question the reality
behind the presumptions. For the purpose of a feminist inquiry into the
relationship between law and society, the following questions may be asked:
q What have been and what are now all women’s experiences of the “life
situation” addressed by the doctrine, process, or area of law under
examination?17
q What assumptions, descriptions, assertions and/or definitions of experience
– male, female, or ostensibly gender neutral – does the law make in this
area?
                                                
15  Wishik, supra note 11, p 25.
16 The Council of Europe (1998), “Gender Mainstreaming, Conceptual Framework; Methodology
and Presentation of Good Practices” , Strasbourg, 1988.
17 For more on the feminist debate on the concept of  “woman”, see below, Chapter 1.4.
8q What is the area of mismatch, distortion, or denial created by the differences
between women’s life experiences and the law’s assumptions or imposed
structures?
q What patriarchal interests are served by the mismatch?
q What reforms have been proposed in this area of law or women’s life
situation? How will these reform proposals, if adopted, affect women both
practically and ideologically?
q In an ideal world, what would a woman’s life situation look like, and what
relationship, if any, would the law have to this future life situation?
q How do we get there from here?18
As the Council of Europe so rightly has pointed out, so called “gender neutral”
texts often reproduce inequalities as it is the male that is taken as the format. In
order to correct this inherited, discriminatory practice, it is rather unequal than
equal treatment that is required.19 It is, therefore, needed to apply a feminist
methodology when looking at gender aspects of legislation and implementation.
“We will not have genuinely ungendered jurisprudence…until we have a legal
doctrine that takes women’s lives as serious as it has taken men’s ”.20
1.2.  The public/private dichotomy
Central to the gendered critique of international law, including refugee law, has
been an analysis of the public/private dichotomy.21 In domestic law the division
can be seen between the public world of work and commerce, and the private
world of home and family. These two spheres are based on different principles of
association. Participation in the (male) public sphere is governed by universal
and impersonal criteria such as rights, equality and property. Participation in the
(female) private sphere is determined by ties of blood and affection, and by the
status of inequality and vulnerability of women in the family.
The division between the public and private spheres clouds the fact that the
domestic arena is itself created by the political realm where the state reserves
the right to intervention.22 When women are denied their human rights in private,
their human rights in the public sphere also suffer, since what occurs in “private”
shapes their ability to participate fully in the public arena.23 Thus, the real
questions are: Who defines legitimate human rights issues and who decides
where the state should enter and for what purpose?
                                                
18 Wishik, supra note 11, at 26-29.
19 The Council of Europe, supra note 16.
20 West, supra note 14, at 88.
21 Heaven Crawley, “Refugee and Gender, Law and Process”, Jordan 2000, at 17.
22 Romany, supra note 10, at 94.
23 Bunch, supra note 7, at 14.
9As a consequence from the public/private dichotomy, intimate violence remains
on the margin: it is considered different, less severe and less deserving of
international condemnation and sanction than officially inflicted violence. But
when stripped of privatisation, sexism and sentimentalism, gender-based
violence is no less grave than other forms of inhumane and subordinating official
violence, which have been prohibited by treaty and customary law and
recognised by the international community as jus cogens, or peremptory norms
that bind universally and can never be violated.24
 Feminist scholars have stressed that the very jurisdiction of international law is
divided along these same public/private lines.25 As international law evolved as
a set of rules intended to regulate relations among states and as it remains
centred on the state, women’s experiences tend to get lost from the agenda. For
instance,
 
q Many abuses against women have not been acknowledged as human
rights violations because they are committed by private persons rather
than by agents of the state.
q Civil and political rights hold a privileged position in human rights law
despite formal recognition by the international community of their
interdependence and indivisibility with economic, social and cultural
rights.
q International norms concerning the life of the family call on states to
protect the institution of the family and enshrine the right of privacy in the
family.26
Refugee law suffers from the same defect. Whilst the refugee definition does not
intrinsically exclude women’s experiences, in practice the public/private
distinction is used in such a way that what women do and what is done to them is
often seen as irrelevant to refugee law. In order to include women’s experiences
into refugee law, it is necessary to move from conventional notions of the
exercise of power as something that has to be within a formal institutional
framework.27
1.3.  Legal equality
Much debate in the feminist discourse has focused on the concept of legal
equality, and there are a number of different responses to this issue. One
                                                
24 Rhonda Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture”, in “Human
Rights of Women, National and International Perspectives”, ed. Rebecca J.Cook, University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1994, 116-152, at 117.
25 Karen Knop, “Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law” (1993),
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 293-344, at 330.
26 Donna Sullivan, “The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law” in
Women’s Rights, Human Rights, Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, Routledge, Great Britain,
1995, 126-134, at 126-127.
27 Crawley, supra note 21, at 24.
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response has been to attempt to equate legal treatment of sex with that of race
and deny that there are in fact any significant natural differences between women
and men. Christine A. Littleton calls this response the “symmetrical” approach. A
competing “asymmetrical” approach rejects this analogy and instead holds that
women and men are, or may be, different and that women and men are often
asymmetrically located in society.
There are two models of the symmetrical vision;
1) “Assimilation” is based on the notion that women, given the chance, really
are or could be just as men.
2) “Androgyny” also posits that women and men are, or at least could be,
very much like each other, but argues that equality requires institutions to
pick some golden mean between the two and treat both sexes as
androgynous persons would be treated.
Asymmetrical approaches, on the other hand, take the position that
differences should not be ignored or eradicated. Asymmetrical approaches
include “special rights”, “accommodation”, and “acceptance”;
1) The “special rights model” affirms that men and women are different, and
asserts that cultural differences, such as childrearing roles, are rooted in
biological ones, such as reproduction. Therefore, it states that society
must take account of these differences and ensure that women are not
punished for them.
2) The “accommodation model”, even though it agrees that treating
biological differences is necessary, argues that cultural and hard-to-
classify differences should be treated under all-equal-treatment or the
androgynous model.
3) A third asymmetrical model would be “acceptance”. It asserts that
eliminating the unequal consequences of sex differences is more
important than debating whether such differences are “real”, and even
more important than trying to eliminate these differences altogether. It is
thus the consequences of gendered difference, and not its source that
equal acceptance addresses. The focus of equality as acceptance is not
on the question of whether women are different, but rather on the question
of how the social fact of gender asymmetry can be dealt with so as to
create some symmetry in the lived out experience of all members of the
community.28
However, at this stage it must be held that concepts of equality and non-
discrimination can only partially explain gender subordination and may even risk
                                                
28 Based on Christine A. Littleton, “Reconstructing Sexual Equality”, in Feminist Legal Theory,
Foundations, Ed. D. Kelly Weisberg, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993, 248-263.
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to trap women’s rights within legal confines that do not adequately capture the
nature of such subordination.29
1.4.  The concepts of women and gender
The definition of women and as well as the question whether it is possible to
generalise the experience of women into one common, is crucial for the
argument in this paper. The notion of a “woman”, as she is presently constructed
by male society, differs according to different schools in feminist theory. Liberal
feminism sees “women” defined primarily as someone confined to the private
sphere; Radical feminism sees her as a man’s sexual object; Cultural feminism
sees her as caring and connected to others; Postmodern feminism sees her so
overly determined that she is an absence, not a presence.30
The definition of “woman” is, as stated above, crucial, but self-definition for
women has not been explored enough yet. It is important that feminists are more
explicit about their understanding of what “woman is” and what “woman should
be”. Patricia Cain suggests that in order to achieve this, consciousness can
serve as a cornerstone in the feminist method. Consciousness is about giving a
voice to the unknown in women’s experience and it brings new understanding by
making known the unknown. Feminist legal theories, which supports the telling of
the individual truths should therefore be built, as well as theories that protect the
space that is shared with others as women construct their identity.31
There has been an evolving recognition by most feminist scholars that women’s
lives can only be fully understood when studied in terms of prevailing gender
relations.32 Gender is a socially constructed definition of women and men. It is
the social design of a biological sex, determined by a conception of tasks,
functions and roles attributed to women and men in society and in public and
private life. As it is a culturally specific definition of femininity and masculinity, it
varies in time and space. The construction and reproduction of gender takes
place at the individual level as well as at the societal level. Individual human
beings shape gender roles and norms through their activities and reproduce
them by conforming to expectations.33 The understanding of gender as both an
aspect of personal identity and an integral part of social institutions and
practices, avoids the pitfalls of voluntarism, that is, the idea that people exercise
free choice over their actions, and various forms of determinism, which suggest
that human behaviour is wholly conditioned by constraints.34
                                                
29 Romany, supra note 10, at 99.
30 Patricia A. Cain, “Feminism and the Limits of Equality” in Feminist Legal Theory,
Foundations, Ed. D. Kelly Weisberg, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993, 237-247, at
244.
31 Ibid.
32 Steans, supra note 12, at 4.
33 The Council of Europe, supra note 16.
34 Steans, supra note 12, at 13.
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However, it is necessary to clarify that on one hand, gender was developed and
is still often used as a term contrasting to sex, in order to depict what is socially
constructed as opposed to what is biologically given. Following this distinction,
gender is typically thought to refer to personality traits and behaviour while sex
refers to the physical body, hence gender and sex are understood as
antonymous. On the other hand, gender has increasingly become used to refer to
any social construction relating to the female/male distinction, including those
constructions that separate “female” bodies from “male” bodies. This latter
usage has emerged when many came to realise that society not only shapes
personality and behaviour, it also shapes the ways in which bodies appear.
Hence, if the body itself is always seen through social interpretation, then sex is
not something that is separate from gender but is, rather, subsumable under it.35
Consequently sex-based and gender-based persecution should be seen as
integral parts of the same phenomenon, and when gender is used throughout this
paper, it is with this latter understanding.
1.5.  Universal human rights for whom?
Human rights law excludes women’s experiences in many ways by an inherent
male bias. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was
prepared, the original draft referred to “…all men are brothers…”. It was thanks
to lobbying of women’s organisations and the president of the working group,
Eleanor Roosevelt, that the text was changed to “all humans are born equal”
and sex was included in the non-discrimination clause.36 When the Refugee
Convention was drafted in 1951 no women participated and this may be part of
the reason why gender-based persecution was overlooked. The consequences
of this will be described in the next chapter in this paper.
The UDHR has, despite the efforts of Mrs Roosevelt, received criticism for being
too male oriented. As the first who advanced the cause of human rights were
Western-educated, propertied men, who mostly feared the violation of their civil
and political rights in the public sphere, this area has been privileged in human
rights work. They did not, however, fear violations in the private sphere of home
as they were the masters of that territory, and this area has consequently been
ignored for a long time from the human rights discourse.37 The public/private
dichotomy did not, however, prevent them from readily pressuring states to
prevent other forms of abuse that occur in the private sphere at the hands of
private actors, such as slavery and racial discrimination. 38
Whereas there is almost a complete consensus that the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of race has become jus cogens39, very few authors
                                                
35 Linda Nicholson, “Interpreting Gender”, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1994,
vol. 20, no.1, 79-103, at 79.
36 Kirilova Eriksson, supra note 9, at 9.
37 Bunch, supra note 7, at 13.
38 Macklin, supra note 8, at 258.
39 Ian Brownlie, ”Principles of International Law”, Oxford University Press, 1998, at 515.
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have argued that the same should be valid for the discrimination on the ground of
sex or gender, even though it effects half of the population in the world.40 Those
norms that are considered jus cogens get universal acclaim by virtue of their
protection of interests which are not limited to a particular state or groups of
states, but which belong to the community as a whole. If human rights are truly
universal, it is difficult to see how, when it involves white supremacy, it constitutes
a violation of jus cogens, whereas male supremacy is considered to be the
internal affair of any individual state.41
Two different doctrines have evolved to include domestic violence, as probably
the most common and widespread drastical human right violations women
suffer, into the human rights discourse;
q Through the theory of accountability the state can be held responsible
under international human rights law for its action as well as its inaction.
This theory finds its bases in the non-discrimination clauses in the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. It provides
justification for the demand that the state’s efforts to combat domestic
violence should at least be on par with its efforts to fight comparable
forms of violent crime.
q An alternative theory claims that unlike other common crimes, domestic
violence is inherently an issue under international human rights law
because it systematically subordinates women. The aim is to maintain
male supremacy and to deprive women of a range of political, social and
economic benefits. Because of this systematic subordination domestic
violence is seen as constituting a violation of international human rights
law in and of itself.42
                                                
40 Kirilova Eriksson, supra note 9, at 9.
41 Romany, supra note 10, at 89.
42 Kenneth Roth, “Domestic Violence as International Human Rights Issue”, in Human Rights of
Women, National and International Perspectives, ed. Rebecca J.Cook, University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1994, 326 – 339, at 332.
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PART 2    REFUGEE LAW
International refugee law occupies a legal space that is characterised by, on the
one hand, the principle of state sovereignty and, on the other hand, competing
humanitarian principles deriving from general international law and from different
treaties.43 Historically, refugee law has been linked less firmly to human rights
than to general principles of public international law, which has enabled states to
pursue their own interest in a global context.44 However, over the years there has
been a development of rapprochement to human rights law. One obstacle when
linking refugee law and human rights, are the different languages in the two
fields, e.g. discrimination and human rights violations do not necessarily amount
to persecution, the notion of state responsibility may have different implications
in the two fields, etc. Therefore, much time must be spent on diligently defining
and exploring the meaning and scope of different notions.
 The central document in refugee law is the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, hereafter referred to as the Refugee Convention.45 It defines
who is a refugee and provides for certain standards of treatment to be accorded
to refugees. However, it says nothing about procedures for determining refugee
status and leaves to the states the choice of means as to implementation on the
national level. Signatory states, although bound by the refugee definition in the
Convention, are free to enact their own laws and regulations concerning the
determination of refugee status.46
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is considered
the highest authority to interpret the Convention. For this reason the UNHCR
Handbook is quoted several times below. The refugee definition in the UNHCR
statute and in the Convention contain very similar definitions of the term
“refugee”. It is for UNHCR to determine status under its Statute  and any relevant
General Assembly resolutions, and for states parties to the Convention and the
Protocol to determine status under those instruments.47
In the Convention a refugee is defined as someone who:
“…owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons for race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside of his country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his country…”48
                                                
43 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, “The Refugee in International Law”, Oxford University Press Inc, New
York, 1996, at v.
44 Reinhard Marx, “Non-Refoulement, Access to Procedures, and Responsibility for Determining
Refugee Claims”, 7 IJRL 3, p 383-406, at 394.
45 The Refugee Convention, Supra note 6.
46 Pamela Goldberg, ”Where in the World is There Safety for Me?: Women fleeing Gender-
Based Persecution”, Women’s Rights, Human Rights, Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, 1995
Routledge, Great Britain, 345-355, at 346.
47 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 43, at 7.
48 The Refugee Convention, supra note 45, Art 1 A.2.
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As can be seen above the refugee in the Refugee Convention has been defined
in a gender-neutral way. However, just as the construction of the civil and political
character of human rights was criticised for stemming from a patriarchal
construction of the public and private spheres in the first part of this paper, the
same could be said for the refugee definition.49 When the drafters of the Refugee
Convention congregated in Geneva not a single woman was to be found
amongst the plenipotentiaries. What was in the mind of the drafters was the
archetypal image of a political refugee, someone who is fleeing persecution
resulting from his direct involvement in political activity. This definition does not
often correspond with the reality of women’s experiences “The law has
developed within a male paradigm which reflects the factual circumstances of
male applicants, but which does not respond to the particular protection needs
of women”.50 Until recently, the way these gender neutral instruments were
interpreted, both at an international and national level, reflected and reinforced
gender biases.51 The discussion concerning gender-based persecution signifies
a first move away from this biased thinking.
2.1. Persecution
The concepts of “persecution” and “well-founded fear of persecution” have not
been expressly defined in any of the UN human rights or refugee conventions.
Instead the UNHCR’s Handbook can give some guidance;
“…it may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on account of
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a
particular social group is always persecution. Other serious
violations of human rights – for the same reasons – would also
constitute persecution.”52
The traditional view of what constitutes persecution reflects a male consideration
of “normal” or acceptable conduct. However, over the past 15 years, there has
been an increased recognition of the need to interpret the notion of persecution
in a manner which is sensitive to issues of gender. One of the first efforts to
recognise the legitimacy of gender-based persecution claims occurred in 1984
when the European Community admitted that such claims might be recognised
under the category of membership in a particular social group.53 In 1985, the
European Parlament called on states to grant refugee status “to women who
suffer cruel and inhuman treatment because  they have violated the moral or
ethical rules of their society.”54 During that same year, the Executive Committee
                                                
49 Romany, supra note 10, at 106.
50 N Kelly, quoted in ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 UNHCR, “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for determining Refugee Status”, Geneva,
1979, para 51.
53 Goldberg, supra note 46, at 347.
54 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees, A Humanitarian Agenda, Box 5.2 Gender-related
persecution, Geneva, 1997.
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of UNHCR issued a recommendation, in which it acknowledges that states may
recognize claims of gender-based persecution under the “particular social
group” category.55 In 1991, the UNHCR adopted Guidelines on the Protection of
Refugee Women.56 These guidelines confirmed the need to address gender-
based persecution and the need for states to recognise claims for asylum and
refugee status for women fleeing persecution on account of gender. At a later
stage, the Executive Committee of UNHCR issued a Conclusion on Violence
Against Women that calls for the “development by States of appropriate
guidelines on women asylum seekers, in recognition of the fact that women
refugees often experience persecution differently from refugee men”.57
The definition of persecution according to refugee law can be seen to contain
two elements. The first is whether the harm apprehended by the claimant
amounts to persecution. The second is whether the state can be held
accountable, in some measure, for the infliction of the harm. Thus, when a female
applicant wants to demonstrate that, as a woman, she has a well-founded fear,
she can firstly, use evidence of her own past persecution. Secondly, she can
point to other “similarly situated” women who have been subject to persecution.
E.g., an Iranian woman who is subject to a law requiring her to wear a veil in
public. If the law is persecutory, a woman will certainly be unable to show that she
has been uniquely singled out by that law (it applies to all women), yet she can
still argue that she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by the
application of the law to her.58
Gender-based violence constitutes a type of harm that is either particular to the
person’s sex or gender, such as female genital mutilation, forced prostitution,
rape and other sexual abuses that affects women disproportionately.59 Gender-
based persecution can take many forms. It can range from the forced marriage
of an underage Zimbabwean woman to a man many years her senior, to a
woman in China who fears being forced to undergo an abortion and perhaps
even sterilisation because she already has one child, to an Iranian woman who
flees her country because she cannot follow the restrictive religious and social
practices mandated by law and fears severe punishment should she return.60
Gender-based persecution includes;
q When a woman is persecuted because of her gender, it addresses the
causal relation between gender and persecution, her gender is the
reason for why she is persecuted.
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q When a woman is being persecuted as a women, it is the form of
persecution that is sex/gender-specific. Understanding the ways a
woman is persecuted as a woman is critical to naming as persecution
things that are done to women and not to men.
q When gender can be considered to be a risk factor that makes a
woman’s fear of persecution more well-founded than that of a man in
similar instances.
Though one or more of these links between gender and persecution may be
present simultaneously in a given case, they are not synonymous. For example, a
woman may be
q persecuted as a woman (e.g. raped) for reasons unrelated to gender (e.g.
membership in an opposition political party);
q not persecuted as a woman but still because of gender (e.g. flogged for
refusing wearing a veil);
q and persecuted as and because one is a woman (e.g. genital mutilation).
All three of these cases present examples of gender-based persecution. But it
does not necessarily mean that they should all be classified as persecution on
grounds of gender, regardless whether gender is propounded as a separate
group of persecution or as a particular social group.
The scheme above may help to clarify that not all persecution of women should
framed as “persecution because of gender”, as that would only reinforce
women’s marginalisation. It would imply that only men have political opinions,
only men are activated by religion, only men have racial presence. In that way it
would create and sustain the stereotype that men “own” the categories of
oppression that are not explicitly “gendrified”. But in the cases where gender is
the discrete basis of persecution, it is critical that it is named such, since it
otherwise would mask the specificity of women’s oppression. 61
2.1.1. Persecuting laws and customs
Gender-based discrimination is practised universally and is enforced through
law, social custom, and individual practice. In 1990, the UNHCR Executive
Committee affirmed the linkage between a violation of the rights guaranteed
under the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW)62 and persecution for purposes of the Refugee Convention, stating
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that severe discrimination prohibited by CEDAW can form the basis for the
granting of refugee status.63
In the UNHCR Handbook it is stated that discrimination amounts to persecution
if:
“the measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a
substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g.
serious restrictions on his (sic!) rights to earn his livelihood, his
rights to practice his religion, or his access to normally available
educational facilities (…) In order to determine whether prosecution
leads to persecution, it will also be necessary to refer to the laws of
the country concerned, for it is possible for a law not to be in
conformity with adopted human rights standards”.64
In 1993, Canada, as one of the first countries in the world, issued guidelines on
how to handle asylum applications resulting from gender-based persecution.
They provide the following clues to the extent that discrimination may be
sanctioned unofficially as “policy” or formally in law:
“A woman’s claim to Convention refugee status cannot be based
solely on the fact that she is subject to a national policy or law to
which she objects. The claimant will need to establish that:
- the policy or law is inherently persecutory; or
- the policy or law is used as a means of persecution for one of
the enumerated reasons; or
- the policy or law, although having legitimate goals, is
administered through persecutory means; or
- the penalty for non-compliance with the policy or law is
disproportionately severe.”65
Thus, it appears that if the law discriminates by selectively abrogating
fundamental human rights of designated groups, the law itself persecutes. In
principle, it should not matter whether it would be relatively “easy” for a woman to
obey the law (and thus avoid persecution), e.g. by wearing a veil, if in so doing
she must forsake a protected freedom. Another example of legislated
discrimination that can be construed as inherently persecutory are Pakistan’s
Hudood laws. The Hudood Ordinances are Islamic Penal Laws which
criminalizes, among other things, adultery, fornication and rape, and prescribe
punishments for these offences that include stoning to death, public flogging and
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amputation.66 These laws affect all citizens of Pakistan, but are applied to
women with particularly disastrous effects. A discriminatory policy with a
legitimate goal but pursued through persecutory means, might be the one child
policy in the People’s Republic of China. A scenario where the penalty for non-
compliance with a discriminatory law might be disproportionately severe, might
be illustrated by the Iranian law that makes a women’s failure to wear a chador a
criminal offence punishable by seventy-five whiplashes.67
2.1.2.        Violence against women
The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women defines
violence against women as:
“any act of gender based violence that results in, or is likely to
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty”.68
A recent report by Amnesty International on violence against women has
eloquently described violence against women and its roots:
“Torture of women is rooted in a global culture which denies women
equal rights with men, and which legitimises the violent
appropriation of women's bodies for individual gratification or
political ends. (…) Violence against women feeds off this
discrimination and serves to reinforce it. When women are abused
in custody, when they are raped by armed forces as ''spoils of war'',
when they are terrorized by violence in the home, unequal power
relations between men and women are both manifested and
enforced. (…)There is an unbroken spectrum of violence that
women face at the hands of men who exert control over them.”69
As Amnesty International points out, the fundamental reason for violence against
women lies in the global culture of inequality. However, the reasons for why
individual women are singled out for violent treatment can vary. It may be
because of her sex and gender, because of her relationship to a man or
because of the social, religious or ethnic group she belongs to or a combination
of these.70
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Violence against women is often connected to certain misconceptualisations of
the notion of “honour”, honour as it is being conceptualised by families and whole
communities in terms of the chastity of “their” women.71 It has been stated by the
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women that:
“A key component of community identity, and therefore the
demarcation of community boundaries, is the preservation of
communal honour. Such honour is frequently perceived, by both
community members and non-community members, as residing in
the sexual behaviour of the women in the community.”72
“If attitudes towards female sexuality are often the cause of
violence against women, it becomes important for society to
“protect” its women from the violence of “the other”.73
Protecting the honour of the woman, and in turn the honour of the nation,
therefore, gains political significance, and will be enforced either directly through
the state, as seen in legislated discrimination and laws regulating women’s
behaviour, or through a woman’s family and community.74 International law has
not been immune from these discriminatory notions of honour either, as until
lately international humanitarian law has addressed sexual assaults in terms of
women’s honour, as is elaborated below.
2.1.2.1. In armed conflicts
The deconstruction of a culture can be considered one of the primary goals of
warfare, because only through its destruction – which involves destruction of
people – can a decision be forced. Women are therefore being targeted
because of their cultural position and their important role within the family
structure.75 Cultural biases toward women in peacetime serve to exacerbate the
exploitation of women during wartime. The kind of gender-specific concepts of
honour that is described above, finds its ultimate expression in times of war
where women are considered to be the vessels of the community honour, and
men its protectors. Sexual violence is and continues to be an effective weapon
as the men who belong to the same group as the raped women, often
exacerbate and perpetuate the crime by rejecting the women that have been
sexually abused and by putting the blame on the women.76
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 When women are being persecuted by state agents in their homes, this has
powerful symbolic motives. It is often intended to demonstrate that the state does
not recognise “boundaries” between public and private spheres, and that
nowhere is sacred. There are clear parallels between family torture, where
women are being tortured or raped in front of their children or husbands, and the
way in which rape has been used as an instrument of war, as a means to
terrorise the (male) enemy and brutalise the whole community through violation of
“its” women.77
As indicated above, an obstacle against the recognition of gender-based
violence in international law has been that, until recently, international
humanitarian law has addressed sexual violence in terms of women’s honour,
separate from other crimes of violence, such as murder, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture. This definition makes sexual violence a moral crime
instead of the violent physical crime it actually is. It also represents biased
thinking, implying that only ”pure” women can be raped. Where rape is treated as
a crime against honour, the honour of women is called into question and virginity
and chastity is often a precondition for rape to qualify as a crime. Honour implies
the loss of status or respect; it reinforces the social view, internalised by women,
that the raped woman is dishonourable.78
Rape and sexual abuse in connection with armed conflicts have proven to be a
very effective propaganda tool, which can further stigmatise the abused women.
In war propaganda women are portrayed as victims and the abuses are blamed
on the enemy and used to instil anger and hate.79 The Zagreb-based Centre for
Women War Victims have expressed their fears as follows:
“… we fear that the process of helping raped women is turning on a
strange direction, being taken over by governmental institutions…
and male gynaecologists in particular. We fear that the raped
women could be used in political propaganda with the aim of
spreading hatred and revenge, thus leading to further violence
against women and to further victimisation of survivors.”80
2.1.2.2. By their family members
The UN Report on Violence Against Women in the Family states that:
“There is no simple explanation for violence against women in the
home. Certainly, any explanation must go beyond the individual
characteristics of the man, the woman and the family and look to
the structure of relationships and the role of society in underpinning
                                                
77 Crawley, supra note 21, at 87.
78 Rhonda Copelon, “Surfacing Gender: Re- Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian
Law”, Hastings Women’s Law Journal, Vol. 5:2, Summer 1994, at 249.
79 Women, Law & Development International, supra note 70, at 20.
80 M.Belic and V.Kesic, quoted in Christine Chinkin, “Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in
International Law”, European Journal of International Law,  Vol. 5 (1994) No.3,
22
that structure. In the end analysis, it is perhaps best to conclude
that violence against wives is a function of the belief, fostered in all
cultures, that men are superior and that the women they live with
are their possessions or chattels that they can treat as they wish
and as they consider appropriate.”81
It has also been argued by feminist scholars that domestic violence equals
torture. Rhonda Copelon bases her argumentation responding to four critical
elements that are generally defined in binding instruments: (1) severe physical
and/or mental pain and suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for specified
purposes; (4) with some form of official involvement, whether active or passive.
In response to the argument that torture is different because its purpose is to
elicit information she states:
“This distinction, which harks back to the original nature of torture,
ignores the contemporary understanding of torture as an engine of
terror… …It may also reflect a gender-biased identification with the
victims of state torture as opposed to domestic violence – the
torture victim resisting the giving of information is heroic, whereas
the battered woman somehow deserves it.”82
Understanding domestic violence as torture would have drastic implications on
refugee law, as the principle of non-refoulement prohibits states to return an
asylum seeker to a country where he/she faces torture.83 Another interesting
aspect is that violence against women within their homes is not limited to
countries of the so-called “developing” world but also exists in the countries in
which women seek asylum.84 Many women have been forced to leave their
countries, normally seen as democratic and respecting human rights, because
the state has not been able to protect them from violent husbands or boyfriends.
2.2.  State responsibility
2.2.1. In human rights law
For a long time, there was an assumption that states are not responsible for
violations of women’s rights in the private or cultural sphere. The reasons for this
have been described in the first part of this paper. As already established above,
this assumption largely ignores the fact that such abuses are often condoned
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and even sanctioned by states even when the immediate perpetrator is a private
person.
However, as the human rights discourse developed and began to take the
experience of women into account, two routes were distinguished to hold states
responsible for systematic “private” male violence against women:
q By systematically failing to provide protection for women from “private”
actors who deprive women of their right to life, liberty and security, the
state becomes complicit in the violation.
q The state can be responsible for failing to fulfil its obligation to prevent
and punish violence against women in a non-discriminatory fashion, a
failure denying women the equal protection of the law.85
In the procedure of determining state complicity in “private” violations against
women, it is not enough to point to random incidents of non-punishment of
perpetrators of violence against women. Thus, it is when the state fails to arrest,
prosecute, and imprison perpetrators of violence against women, that it can be
interpreted as acquiescence in or ratification of the private actor’s conduct. It can
be described as the verifiable existence of a parallel state with its own system of
justice; a state sanctioned by the official state, which protects male power
through embodying and ensuring existing male control over women at every
level.86
2.2.2. In refugee law
There is an important difference between a failure of state protection under
international refugee law and the notion of state responsibility in human rights
law. Under refugee law it needs to be established that there has been a failure of
state protection and not necessarily that the state is accountable or culpable for
the harm sustained or feared, as described above. By way of example, an
applicant will need to show that a policy or law is inherently persecutory, that the
policy or law is used as a means of persecution for one of the enumerated
reasons, that the policy or law, although having legitimate goals, is administered
through persecutory means, or that the penalty for non-compliance is
disproportionately severe. In this context, the existence of certain laws or social
policies or the manner in which they are implemented, may themselves constitute
or involve a failure of state protection.87 Thus, the turning point when a “common
crime” becomes persecution depends on the role of the state in systematically
failing to protect the claimant from the feared harm.88
The failure to recognise violence against women as a violation of  human rights
for which a state is accountable, as described above, also has implications in
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refugee law for female asylum seekers. The problem for many female asylum
seekers may not lie so much in the demonstrating that the abuse constitutes a
“serious harm”, but instead to show that the state is implicated in, or has failed to
protect from, that harm.89
It should, therefore be considered persecution for the purpose of refugee law,
when the government is passively encouraging and legitimising the abuse of
women by refusing to intervene to protect against human rights violations, to
investigate charges, or to prosecute and punish perpetrators of harmful acts.90
The same applies if a state pays inadequate attention to prevent one particular
form of violence in relation to other comparable forms of violence.91 Further,
statues and laws which are enforced by the government can be gender-neutral
albeit discriminatory and applied in a manner that targets women and also in
these cases the state involvement is clear.92 In situations of domestic violence,
state inaction may take the form of official condoning (e.g., marital rape
exemptions in law). However, it is more often the case of lack of police response
to pleas for assistance, refusal to investigate or prosecute individual cases, and
a reluctance to convict or punish. This indicates that, while violence against
women may be legally proscribed, it is socially accepted.93 The UNHCR
Handbook takes the position that “acts by private citizens, when combined with
state inability to protect, constitute “persecution”.94
In order to respond to the experiences of women as asylum seekers, the
assessment within the determination process of whether there has been a failure
of state protection must reflect existing international obligations to protect
against systematic abuse based on gender.95 The duty imposed on the state to
prevent and punish should be one of due diligence. Due diligence requires the
existence of reasonable measures of prevention that a well administered
government could be expected to exercise under similar circumstances.96
2.3.  The grounds for persecution
Some of the most difficult issues in current jurisprudence arise over whether a
gender-related asylum claim involves persecution “on account of” one of the five
enumerated grounds which are norms of non-discrimination.97 While race,
religion, nationality, member of a particular social group and political opinion
appear in the 1951 Refugee Convention, persecution and well-founded fear of
persecution on the basis of gender are not included as an explicit category.
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2.3.1. Race
In the UNHCR’s Handbook it is stated that racial discrimination amounts to
persecution if:
“…a person’s human dignity is affected to such an extent as to be
incompatible with the most elementary and inalienable human
rights, or where the disregards of racial barriers is subject to serious
consequences. (…)There may (…) be situations where due to a
particular circumstances affecting the group, such membership will
in itself be sufficient ground to fear persecution.98
Women are often not only targeted because of their own race but also because
they are perceived as propagating a racial group or ethnic identity through their
reproductive role.99 An example of how race and gender interact can be found in
the propaganda against the Tutsi women in Rwanda in the early 1990’s. When
the genocide began in 1994, rape of Tutsi women were widespread. The
targeted use of sexual violence against Tutsi women were fuelled by both ethnic
and gender stereotypes, Tutsi women were targeted on the basis of the
genocide propaganda which had portrayed them as calculating seductress-
spies bent on dominating and undermining the Hutu. They were also targeted
because of the gender stereotype which portrayed them as beautiful and
desirable, but inaccessible to Hutu men whom they allegedly looked down upon
and were “too good” for. Rape served to shatter these images by humiliating,
degrading, and ultimately destroying the Tutsi women.100
2.3.2. Religion
Persecution on religious grounds may take various forms. According to the
UNHCR Handbook it may consist of:
“…e.g. prohibition of membership of a religious community, of
worship in private or in public, of religious instruction, or serious
measures of discrimination imposed on persons because they
practice their religion or belong to a particular religious
community”.101
There is a considerable degree of overlap between the grounds of religion and
political opinion which in many cases involve social norms, for instance the
imposition of a dress code may rather signify a battle between women and the
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state over the control of the individual’s body and personal space, than an
expression of religion.102
In many cases, being deemed as fearing persecution on the basis of religion,
may be too simplistic. At least to the extent that this may not comport with the
claim that it is not religion per se, that is the problem, but rather the
interpretations and the discursive uses of a particular religion, e.g. Islam, by the
state.103 In order to understand the experiences of women from countries such as
Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Sudan, it is necessary to see that the
repression does not stem from the fact that Islam is inherently more oppressive
to women than other religions, but rather from the fact that the regimes use
women as a way of signalling their agenda.104
2.3.3. Nationality
“The term “nationality” in this context is not to be understood only as
“citizenship”, it also refers to membership of en ethnic or linguistic group and
may occasionally overlap with the term “race”.”105
As stated in the UNHCR Handbook, the term nationality and race may in many
cases overlap. The dynamics between gender and nationality are much the
same as described above with regards to race. Furthermore, as with race, the
nature of the persecution in many cases take a gender-specific form, most
commonly that of sexual violence including rape in particular, although not
exclusively, against women and girls.106
A gender-related claim of fear of persecution may also be linked to reasons of
nationality in situations where a law causes a woman to lose her nationality (i.e.
citizenship) and the protection combined therewith, because of marriage to a
foreign national.107
2.3.4. Member of a particular social group
One possibility of fitting in gender-based persecution in the existing refugee
definition, is to qualify persecuted groups of women as a “particular social
group”. This is the solution that UNHCR itself has been advocating;
“(…)States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt
the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or
inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social
mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a
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"particular social group" within the meaning of Article 1 A(2) of the
1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.”108
By using this solution it would be possible to e.g. analyse the Saudi dress code
by considering the plethora of rules, policies, customs, and laws circumscribing
the lives of Saudi women. Women are not allowed to drive, must sit in the back
of buses, are limited in their educational and employment opportunities, and may
not travel without consent of a male relative. Thereby, the restriction on dress
may be understood as one strand in a web of oppression that cumulatively
amounts to persecution of Saudi women, as a particular social group. The
various restrictions lead to “consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature
for the claimant”109 in terms of her ability to access educational facilities, to earn
a livelihood, and to function as an autonomous and independent individual.110
2.3.5. Political opinion
“ Holding opinions different from those of the Government is not in
itself a ground for claiming refugee status, and an applicant must
show that he has a fear of persecution for holding such opinions.
This presupposes that the applicants hold opinions not tolerated by
the authorities, which are critical of their policies or methods. It also
presupposes that such opinions have come to the notice of the
authorities or are attributed by them to the applicant.”111
Women who are imprisoned for political reasons run the risk of “double
punishment”, as they are not only punished because they oppose the regime in
some way, but also because they shirk the traditional role of women, by being
politically active at all.112 A woman may also suffer harm on the basis of an
imputed political opinion as a result of the perception that her political views are
aligned with those of a dominant family or community members.113
Political opinion is often interpreted as only encompassing traditional “public”
political activity. This is, however, only a reflection of gender bias and should be
replaced by a broad interpretation of the ground. A broader interpretation would
make it possible to include activities that are not so publicly visible, e.g.
providing food, clothing, medical care, hide people, pass messages and so on.
2.3.6. Gender
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The initial omission of gender is understood by many as a reflection of post-
World War II thinking.114 Unfortunately, this omission has had severe implications
for many female asylum seekers all over the world, which we can see by the
discussion on how to include gender-based persecution into the already existing
grounds for asylum in  the Convention.
While there are differences between women across the world, there are also
many commonalities; and while the pattern of gender inequalities varies around
the regions, it is nevertheless a global phenomenon.115 There is a number of
international reports that have pointed out the global nature of violence against
women and that also indict states for their complicity in perpetuating its
invisibility and privatisation.116 It must, therefore, be acknowledged, that in
addition to basic needs shared with all asylum applicants, female asylum
applicants have particular needs that reflect their gender and their position within
society. These unique needs of females are a function not of innate gender
differences, but of pervasive gender discrimination and women’s resulting
inferior position in most societies.117
 
Obviously, not all cases where a woman is persecuted, she is persecuted on the
base of her gender. Even though a sixth category of gender would be introduced,
every application would still have to be considered on an individual basis in
order to determine what is the actual ground for the persecution. In some cases
women will be able to make claims for refugee status on one of the existing five
grounds in the Convention, as has been described above. But for many, the
persecution experienced or feared is of a type not traditionally recognised under
the Convention or under most countries’ asylum eligibility laws.118
2.4. Misconceptualisation or reconceptualisation?
As a consequence of the omission of gender among the grounds of persecution
in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the discussion has focused on whether
women’s experiences can and should be interpreted so that they may be
included into the already existing grounds or whether it is instead necessary to
add a sixth ground (gender), in order to encompass all forms of gender-based
persecution. The question is whether interpreting women’s special experiences
into the existing grounds should be considered a misconceptualisation as was
discussed in the first part of this paper - a misconceptualisation that serves to
maintain the original presumptions and does not challenge the basis for these
(biased) presumptions. Can the introduction of gender as a sixth ground bring
about a reconceptualisation that would reveal, instead of conceal, the
persecution that has its origin in women’s distinctive existential and material
state of being?119
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UNHCR and the European Parliament have recommended that gender-based
persecution claims be understood to fall within the category of “member of a
particular social group”. However, with this recommendation they failed to
acknowledge other potential bases for establishing gender-based
persecution.120 Furthermore, this option, although it may produce socially
desirable results, does not recognise the importance of the issue of persecution
on account of gender. Gender as a social category might be an appropriate
remedy if the persecution of women were isolated or temporary, but that
approach does not afford women enough protection within the context of
society’s recognised, widespread, and institutional persecution of women
worldwide.121 Furthermore, it must be  acknowledged that the grounds of race,
religion and nationality are no less socially constructed than gender.122
 
To ground gender-based persecution in political opinion does not share the
same partiality as religion or race in the way that the latter is addressing only one
single aspect of the persecution experienced by the woman claimant. Instead, by
equating resistance to gender oppression with a political opinion, one seizes the
language of liberal democratic rights discourse and refashions it for feminist use.
However, the same defect of masking gender under another name can be held
against it.123 Also, by using this language one risks being caught in the trap of
voluntarism, the idea that people exercise free choice over their actions. For
instance, if a woman who escapes a situation of domestic violence is deemed to
have done so on the ground of persecution of her political opinion, rather than
her gender, it may imply that other women who have not escaped (or have not
tried to) do not have the political opinion that they have the right to live without
violence. Such a logic appears even more questionable as it is well-established
in the research on domestic violence that one of the mechanisms behind it is that
this kind of violence becomes part of the every day life of the woman - it
becomes the normality. The trap of perceived normality is one of the reasons
why it is so difficult for a battered wife to leave her abusing man.124 In that regard
gender as a sixth ground would provide for a better recognition of the dynamics
behind the construction and reproduction of gender.
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PART 3  THE SWEDISH EXAMPLE
Having looked at gender and refugee law from an international perspective, we
now turn to domestic legislation and application. The way gender-based
persecution is dealt with in national refugee legislation differs considerably
between countries. This chapter will focus on the Swedish example. The choice
of Sweden has two reasons; firstly, the author is herself Swedish and is therefore
more familiar with the situation in this country, and second, the fact that Sweden
prides itself of being among the most advanced in the world with regard to
equality between sexes. It is, therefore, interesting to analyse how Sweden deals
with issues of gender and sex equality when it comes to citizens of other
countries, in particular refugees.
A new clause for gender-based persecution was introduced in the Swedish
legislation in 1997, as has already been explained in the introduction. Since its
introduction this gender-clause has been used to grant residence permits only in
some very few cases. All of these cases concern female genital mutilation. In
order to find plausible causes for the rare use of this clause, this section will
examine the practice of the Swedish immigrant authorities and strives to
establish on which basic assumptions and understandings that practice is
based. The sources for this section are the Swedish Migration Board’s
(Migrationsverket) Guidelines on Gender-based Persecution, which include a
survey and case studies,125 and a report from the Swedish Refugee Advice
Centre which analysed 80 Swedish asylum cases from a gender perspective.126
3.1.           Legislation
3.1.1. On gender in general
The Swedish model for equality between sexes has since long been based on
what has been called a symmetrical vision (likhets-principen). Thus, in the eyes
of the law, men and women are equal. It is the almost complete absence of any
mentioning of gender in the legislation that is the most striking feature of the
Swedish model. Hence, gender neutral legislation is the norm in the Swedish
legislation and the law is not allowed to differentiate between women and men
except for in two cases, i.e. military service and measures to increase equality at
work.127 Yet, another step outside of the gender neutral norm was taken in 1998
when a special provision against the crime of violence against women in a
relationship was introduced.128 This provision clearly recognises the
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asymmetrical position of men and women in the society and the gender
dimension of this violence.129
Traditionally, Swedish laws pertaining to the situation of women have had a
primarily empirical focus, i.e. they have first and foremost been practical-
concrete and were seen as an active strategy to improve the position of women
in society.130 This has not prevented that progressive legislative changes which
are aimed at enhancing equality between sexes have normally not been used
very offensively by the Swedish courts.131 Over time, it has become obvious that
the very view on the law, its structures and its principles and the interpretations of
different basic legal institutions seem to stop or at least hamper more
fundamental changes.132
The innovation of introducing a specific gender clause in the Swedish refugee
legislation can thus be viewed as an anomaly in traditional Swedish legislation,
in that it emphasizes gender in a legislation that otherwise is silent on the issue,
with the few exemptions mentioned above. On the other hand, it may also form
part of an effort to remedy underlying imbalances in the same spirit as the crime
on violence against women. For now, however, one can only  speculate on the
actual origins of the gender clause, as, whereas the preparatory work on the
revision of the legislation on violence against women was very ambitious and
profound, the same can hardly be said about the preparatory work to the new
gender clause in refugee law. (More on this below!)
3.1.2. On asylum issues
Before 1997, an asylum seeker could get a Swedish residence permit as a
Convention refugee, as a de facto refugee or on humanitarian grounds.133 De
facto refugee status was granted to asylum seekers who, without being a
refugee in the meaning of the Refugee Convention, were unwilling to return to
their countries of origin on account of the political situation there and were able
to plead very strong grounds in support of this. In 1983, a proposal to include
also persons fleeing gender-based persecution in this category was rejected
with the argument that persons fleeing gender-based persecution should instead
be granted residence permits on humanitarian grounds.134 Yet, in cases where
applicants are granted residence permits on humanitarian grounds, there is no
right to such protection, as it is granted by discretion in cases where the
conditions of removal would make a deportation inhumane.135
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In 1997, a new structure and a new terminology was introduced in the Swedish
Aliens Act (Utlänningslagen).136 The term “de facto refugee” was taken out and
a new category was introduced to cover what the law terms “persons otherwise
in need of protection”. In this category a new protection ground was introduced
which covers persons who “have a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of his gender (kön) or sexuality”. At the same time the Swedish parliament
rejected the idea of including gender under the category of “member of a
particular social group” in the 1951 Refugee Convention, claiming instead that
this type of persecution would, through the special article, get a stronger
protection than before.137
The new article 3.3 reads as follows:138
“In this law, the term ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’ refers
to aliens who, in cases other than those referred to in section 2139
(i.e. cases covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention, author’s
remark), has left the country of which he is a citizen because he
1. has a well-founded fear of being sentenced to death penalty or
corporal punishment, or of being subjected to torture or other
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 140
2. needs protection on account of an external or internal armed
conflict or cannot return to his country of origin on account of an
environmental disaster or
3. has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his gender
(kön) or homosexuality.” 141
In the preparatory work to the new article it is explained that the article is written
with the 1951 Refugee Convention in mind, i.e. the level of persecution and fear
should be equivalent to that required by the Convention to qualify for refugee
status. It is also expressed that a combination of different harassments and
restrictive measures may constitute a ground for asylum, even though each
separate action may not.142
As stated above, the preparatory work on the new gender clause does not
provide much guidance concerning the interpretation and implementation of the
law. The major confusion arises over the interpretation of the notion of “kön”, as
has already been described above. But also a more thorough investigation of the
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gender dimension of persecution, as was provided in the preparatory work on
the law on violence against women, would be needed.
3.1.3.        The confusion of gender
As a consequence of the fact that there is no explanation of the notion of “kön” in
the preparatory work, there has been some discussion whether it  should be
understood as encompassing both the aspect of “sex” and “gender”, or only one
of them. Kristina Folkelius and Gregor Noll have questioned whether “kön” refers
to sex or gender, claiming that the term “kön” is equivalent to the term sex and
“genus” should be used in Swedish for gender.143 Whereas this distinction has
been adopted to a certain degree in academic discussions in Sweden, this is
not the case when it comes to legislation. “Genus” in Swedish is a highly
academic term used mostly for purely scientific reasons, while the traditional
meaning of kön covers both sex and gender. Furthermore, Swedish legislation
has solely used the term kön throughout its history on issues concerning gender
equality.144 Likewise, the official Swedish translation of “gender-based violence”
is könsbetingat våld.145
Thus, when the preparatory work is silent on the interpretation of “kön” the
conclusion must be that it should have the same meaning as it had has in
previous legislation. The restrictive interpretation of gender-related legislation by
implementing organs should not be mistaken for a limitation of the law to
(biological) sex, setting aside cases based on (social) gender. There is no
indication that this was the intention of the law when it was introduced.
There is a number of statements in the Guidelines that give the impression that
the Migration Board does not fully take account of the gender aspect of “kön”;
q “women who have been exposed to gender-based persecution demand
special attention in the same way as men who have been tortured or
otherwise exposed to severe abuses (…)”146
This statement can of course be explained with the symmetrical vision that
has long been the basis in Swedish legislation, men and women are just
the same and therefore require identical treatment. However, the Board
thereby overlooks the dynamics behind gender-based persecution and
ignores that gender guidelines are needed just because gender-based
violence is different and has other consequences for the female victim
than torture has for a male victim.
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q “…other (forms of persecution) are completely gender specific, i.e. they
only concern women, e.g. forced abortion or feminine genital
mutilation.”147
The examples provided for “completely gender specific” persecution
support the theory that “kön” should be interpreted “sex”, as they both
concern the female body. Apparently, according to the Migration Board,
persecution is completely gender specific when it concerns body parts
which only exist on women. Thus, as men are the norm, it is when
specifically female body parts are attacked that persecution becomes
gender-specific.
q “…when there is a risk for honour killing (…) the gender clause is less
relevant as the tradition of honour killings is in the nearest gender
neutral; it is an act that can be done to whoever has broken a social
norm (…). A similar reasoning can be applied on cases where a woman
risks to be punished by the authorities in an inhuman way, i.e. through
flogging or stoning. Such inhuman punishments are most often  not
gender-specific.”148
Also with this statement the Migration Board overlooks the gender
dimension of notions of social norms and honour killings. (More on this
below!) It also fails to acknowledge that even though the method of
punishment may be gender neutral, it may nevertheless be a component
of gender-based persecution if it is used in a gender specific way, e.g. for
crimes that only women are sentenced for or as punishments that are
implemented in a different way for women and men.
q “Also in the case of less severe phenomenon as risk of social
outcasting the same argumentation is valid.”149
The argumentation referred to is the one above, i.e. social outcasting
should be considered as gender neutral, as it may in theory apply to both
gender. Of course this statement neglects that social norms often are
different and harder for women, as are the punishments for breaking
them, which clearly makes social outcasting a highly gendered
phenomenon. It gets yet another gender dimension as it is virtually
impossible for a woman to survive without the support of her family and
community in some countries. From a female point a view social
outcasting can therefore be a question of life and death, which contradicts
that classifying as “less severe” by the Migration Board.
3.2.           Practice
It is difficult to draw any clear conclusions from looking at statistics that are made
available from the Migration Board. The obstacles are several:
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q Even though data has been collected concerning female applicants, the
corresponding data is not available for male applicants.
q In cases where external researchers obtained access to case files, the
selection of the case files is still made by the Migration Board.
q The motivations in the decisions are often very short and often do not
provide enough information to clarify on which basis and reasoning the
decision has been based on.
Since the gender article was introduced in 1997 the following statistics
concerning residence permits given to female asylum seekers have been
collected. The figures show the numbers of women granted asylum and indicates
on which articles in the Swedish Aliens Act the decisions were based.
Year art 3:2
(Convention
Refugees)
art 3:3 p1
(Torture)
art 3:3 p3
(Gender)
Humanitarian
grounds150
1997 551 211 5 3051
1998 444 247 2 2099
1999 299 244 15 1532
2000 223 374 7 3314
    
The Migration Board claims that the actual number of applicants that claim
gender-based persecution is a relatively small compared to the total number of
applications.151 During the years 1997-1999, a mere 22 women were given
residence permits under the new gender clause and they all concerned female
genital mutilation. No other form of claimed gender-based persecution has
resulted in a successful application.152 As the torture clause provides a better
protection than the gender clause, in cases where they both can be claimed,
preference is given to the torture clause.
The Migration Board estimates that the number of cases of gender-based
persecution is limited to approximately 5% of all women seeking asylum in
Sweden.153 It is difficult to assess the relevance of this figure, as the Migration
Board does not explain which information or conclusion this estimate is made
on. For instance, is it limited to cases where the gender clause has been used
so far, i.e. female genital mutilation, or does it purport to include also other forms
of gender persecution?
In order to find plausible causes for the rare use of the gender clause, the focus
will now turn to the practice of the Swedish immigrant authorities. Such an
analysis is, however, bound to be rather indicative and inconclusive as the
material available is so sparse and uninformative. Thus, an exhaustive account
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of the Swedish asylum practice cannot be expected. However, it is nevertheless
possible to establish some indications of how gender-based persecution is dealt
with by the Swedish immigrant authorities.
3.2.1.        Gendered customs and laws
The report by the Swedish Refugee Advice Centre states that a claim of gender-
based persecution most often involves different kinds of gender-discriminating
customs and laws.154 However, in no such case was a residence permit granted
based on the gender clause.155 This may seem counter-intuitive, as one would
imagine that it was for this type of cases that the gender clause was introduced.
A closer look at the preparatory work and the Migration Board’s guidelines
provides some clues to this effect.
In the preparatory work to the new article it is stated that:
“As some referral instances have pointed out it is hardly so that
anyone risks persecution solely on the ground of belonging to a
certain gender/sex (kön). It has to be that the person concerned at
the same time is breaking the laws or customs of the country.”156
Thus, with the understanding that “kön” only refers to sex this would imply that it is
not the biology of women that makes them persecuted. While this may be true to
a certain degree, there are some objections that can be made against it;
q The same argument could be made for persecution on the grounds on
race and nationality. Are minorities and ethnic groups persecuted
because they are born into these or is it because they resist the role that
the society assigns to them?
q Is it possible to distinguish so definite between gender and sex? Even
though they may express different aspects of a personality, they are still
intertwined and are constantly interacting with each other, as was
described in the first part.
q There is hardly any parallel discussion on this in the international human
rights discourse. Instead efforts are made to distinguish when women
are discriminated or their rights are violated for biological reason and
when it is based in perceptions of gender. Thus if a women can be
discriminated against because she is a woman according to human
rights law and it is possible that discrimination may amount to persecution
as is stated in the UNHCR Handbook, the conclusion must be that she
can be persecuted because she is a women.
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q Are minorities and ethnic groups persecuted because they are born into
these or is it because they resist the role that the society assigns to them?
In the latter case, they could as well be said to express a political opinion
when they object to this assignation.
“Where measures of discrimination are, in themselves, not of a
serious character, they may nevertheless give raise to a
reasonable fear of persecution if they produce, in the mind of the
person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and insecurity as
regards his future existence. Whether or not such measures of
discrimination in themselves amount to persecution must be
determined in the light of all circumstances…”157
The Migration Board used the statement in the preparatory work to reject the
idea that general customs and legislations in a country, e.g.  the dress code in
Iran, may constitute gender-based persecution.158 In this regard it is interesting
to recall the discussion in the first part concerning the development of jus
cogens.159 Would it be possible for the Migration Board to have a similar
position regarding the race discriminating laws under the former apartheid
regime in South Africa?
The activity requirement in the statement in the preparatory work raises other
concerns; does it imply that a woman must already have broken these laws and
customs before she has a right to seek asylum? It seems rather unreasonable to
expect of a woman in e.g. Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to walk in the streets of
Kabul without a burqua160, before she can be considered to be persecuted on
the base of her gender by the regime. Most likely, she would not even have
survived long enough to seek asylum. Yet, if an action is not needed and it is
sufficient for the asylum seeker to state that she is opposed to the customs or the
law, the reference in the preparatory work seems unnecessary as it must be
considered established that the asylum seeker opposes the laws and the
customs she is fleeing from in this case.
Furthermore, in the UNHCR Handbook persecution on the ground of political
opinion demands that “…the applicant’s opinions not tolerated by the
authorities have come to the notice of the authorities or are attributed by them
to the applicant”.161 Racial discrimination amounts to persecution if “…a
person’s human dignity is affected to such an extent as to be incompatible with
the most elementary and inalienable human rights, or where the disregard of
racial barriers is subject to serious consequences.”162 This would imply that the
Swedish Migration Board demands more activity of a woman who is persecuted
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on the base of her gender than of a person that is persecuted on the base of
his/her race, where it is enough that his/her dignity is affected to a certain extent.
Could it be so that women’s dignity is considered worth less to protect than that
of a man of colour? Thus, when it is a woman who is severely discriminated, it is
also needed that she openly opposes the customs and laws. This would imply
that when a woman wants to exercise her basic human rights and freedoms she
is adopting a certain political opinion, while men of a certain race, nationality or
religion have inherent universal human rights.
In none of the cases that were studied in the report by the Swedish Refugee
Advice Centre, was there a discussion concerning the will or ability of the state to
protect the women, not even when it came to states that have a gender-
discriminating legislation.163
3.2.2.        Rape and other forms of sexual violence
Among the 42 cases concerning sexual violence that were examined in the
report from the Swedish Refugee Advice Centre, a residence permit based on
the “gender-clause” was not granted in a single case. In 18 cases the applicant
was given a residence permit on humanitarian grounds.
In the guidelines from the Migration Board, there is no reference to the social
consequences of rape and other forms of sexual violence that the victims of
these crimes face in many countries. This is highly unfortunate as, which has
been described in the second part of this paper, for a victim of sexual violence,
the societal consequences afterwards may themselves constitute an ever bigger
threat for her life and security than the crime itself. The stigmatisation and
ostracising of the victim form part of the gender dimension of sexual violence.
3.2.3.        Domestic violence
Of all cases involving domestic violence, examined in the report by the Swedish
Refugee Advice Centre, all but one applicant was rejected. The applicant in that
one case which resulted in approval, was allowed to stay on humanitarian
grounds. In several cases information on a husband’s record of violence or a
threat of murder was commented on by wordings such as “problems of a private
nature, marital problems, problems of a family nature”. This phrasing can be
put in contrast to the statements in the preparatory work on legislative reforms on
violence against women in Sweden which states that “in many areas there is an
imbalance in the power division between sexes. The most extreme example of
this imbalance is violence that men use against women who they have or have
had a close relationship to. (…) Men’s violence against women, therefore,
constitutes a serious societal problem.”164 Thus, when women are being
beaten by their husbands in another country it is a private matter, but when
Swedish women are being beaten it is classified as societal issue.
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In none of the cases examined in the report was there any discussion concerning
the background information on gender-discriminating customs and laws in
connection to domestic violence. This fact is most remarkable as it is, as has
been explained in the previous parts in this paper, just from this angle that it is
possible to determine whether a domestic violence case constitute persecution.
It is further stated in the report that in most cases a claimed risk to be physically
and sexually abused by a husband was connected to other forms of gender-
related risks, such as getting sentenced for a husband’s adultery accusations,
honour killings, etc. There was, however, no discussion concerning the possibility
of that the accumulation of these risks would together constitute persecution.165
The guidelines treats the issue of domestic violence with complete silence.
3.2.4.        Honour killings
As the guidelines treat the phenomenon of so called honour killings, it is defined
as “extreme violence that in most cases can be connected to the private
sphere”. As was described above, the Migration Board claims that the gender
clause is not relevant in cases of risk for honour killings as they can be
considered as gender neutral. It may, theoretically, be executed against whoever
has violated a norm or custom in the society.
This extremely formalistic way of interpreting the crime of honour killing is a clear
contradiction with how honour killings are described in the international human
rights discourse. You don’t need very strong gender lenses to be able to realise
that even though the word honour killing may appear gender neutral, in practice it
only concerns women. It is the different social norms for women and the
gendered notion of honour in connection with the low status of women that
creates the basis for this crime.166 Honour killings have been condemned in
several international reports that confirm the gender dimension to this crime,
including inter alia the United Nations Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions167 and  the UN Security Council168.
Further, the guidelines claim that the practice of “blood feud” should be included
among honour killings. The institution of the "blood feud" can be considered as a
male counterpart to "honour" killings of women. The aim is not punishment of a
murderer, but satisfaction of the blood of the person murdered or, initially,
satisfaction of one's own honour when it has been maculated.169 Although it can
be established that honour killings and blood feuds both treat notions of honour,
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it does not mean that the mechanisms behind these practices are the same.
Neither does it mean that by lumping the two together, the crimes become
gender neutral.
The Migration Board states that if the home country cannot or is not willing to
provide protection, it may be possible to grant asylum under the torture article. 170
It is again difficult to see why a threat to life should be classified as torture
because it has a gendered dimension. Also, take note of the reference to the
report of the United Nations Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions (e.g. killings/murders) above.
3.2.5.        Female genital mutilation (FGM)
As stated above, the only category of cases that have led to granting of
residence permits based on the new gender clause, are cases where women
fear to be subjected to female genital mutilation. In the Migration Board’s
guidelines it stated that also the torture clause may be used to give asylum to
women who fear FGM since it is to be considered an “inhuman act”. 171  Again,
a gender based act of persecution is not labelled torture, but is circumscribed
with other expressions.
The cases involving FGM are the only cases which involves a discussion of the
surrounding social context according to the report by the Swedish Refugee
Advice Centre. Even though an applicant cannot show that her personal
situation is so, that it could be said for certain that she would be mutilated, the
knowledge about the general conditions in the country gives her a right to a
residence permit. The general conditions includes e.g. the existence of FGM and
difficulties to resist the social pressure and forced FGM. 172 Consideration has
also been taken to whether there are known cases of where women have been
seeking the protection against FGM and that traditional customs seems to be an
area where the local authorities consider that they should not get involved.173
The example of FGM shows that there is a possibility to take into consideration
the wider context and the particularity of the act of persecution is regarded.
Unfortunately, these considerations and discussions are lacking from the other
cases of gender-based persecution, which may be part of the reason why those
applicants were not allowed to stay.
3.3.           Critique of the Swedish legislation
The gender clause in the Swedish Aliens Act has been criticised because it
gives women less protection than if they are claiming asylum as Convention
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refugees or according to the torture article. In this regard, it has even been
claimed that the Swedish law can be seen as discriminatory against women.174
By comparison to the gender clause the Convention refugee category gives
access to the following benefits:
q Mandatory family reunion after recognition according to Article 4 of the
1990 Dublin Convention.175
q A shorter delay in naturalisation and a potentially more favourable status
under domestic law.
q A travel document in accordance with Article 28 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention.
Compared to the gender clause, the torture clause offers the benefit of an
absolute protection from removal.176
Some author’s have warned that Sweden have set a dangerous precedent by
introducing a special category for cases with a gender aspect. They fear that this
solution may to easily be misunderstood as exclusion of these cases from the
framework of international law by other countries.177
3.3.1. Remedies
As has already been stated in the beginning of this chapter, the Swedish
legislation is based on a symmetrical vision and gender has generally been
absent from legislative texts. The introduction of a clause specifically referring to
gender in the Aliens Act can, therefore, be seen as a novelty in the Swedish
legislation. The recognition that a person (a woman) may be persecuted on
account of her gender must stem from an understanding of the asymmetrical
positions of women and men in society. Given the fact that this is a new concept
in Swedish law, it would be natural to expect that extra efforts had been put into
the preparatory works on clarifications in order to avoid  mistakes in the acts
implementation. It is, thus, quite remarkable that the preparatory works are so
silent on the new gender clause. When a new criminal provision on “gross
violations of a woman’s integrity” was introduced a year after the gender clause
in the Aliens Act, it was accompanied by detailed preparatory work which
describe in detail the mechanisms behind men’s violence against women, an
analysis of effects on society, etc. Similarly detailed research should also have
preceded the introduction of the gender clause in the Aliens Act. At the same
time, it is important to keep gender explicitly mentioned as a ground for
persecution as it flows out of the  official Swedish policy that recognises the
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imbalance of power between the sexes on a domestic level. It should, therefore,
also do so in its relationship with aliens, i.e. refugees.
It would, however, not be enough with a clarifying preparatory work. That would
have to be followed up with extensive training of the personnel in the immigration
authorities. To distinguish the gender dimension demands a certain change of
mind, as officials would have to develop what has been described as “gender
lenses” earlier in this paper. Clearly, this is something that does not happen
automatically through a change of the law.
One of the few things expressly stated in the preparatory work is that the
legislators wanted to strengthen the protection for gender-based persecution.
Practical experience so far has shown that this objective has clearly failed, as
has been explained above. In order for the gender clause to have the effect the
legislator (presumably) intended, a number of measures would have to be taken:
q First and foremost, the protection accorded by the gender clause must be
strengthened and give the same level of protection as the 1951
Convention.
q It should be clarified that the gender clause ought to be seen as
complementary to the five grounds in the 1951 Refugee Convention but
not as exclusive, as persecutions on other grounds also may have gender
dimensions.
q Detailed and extensive research should be undertaken by the legislator
on gender-based persecution and the mechanisms behind it, so that it
can be clarified which cases the clause is designed for.
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Conclusion
The first part of this thesis described the feminist methodology and its “gender
lenses” that this paper has strived to apply. The question then arises: how can
one make women and their experiences visible and how does one adjust
existing systems and structures so that they take account of these experiences?
It has been argued that many feminist-inspired legislative reforms during the past
twenty years were achieved by categorising women’s injuries as analogous to
injuries men suffer. This method should be regarded as a misconceptualisation
as it maintains the original (male-biased) presumptions and does not challenge
the basis for these presumptions. Instead, reconstructive feminist jurisprudence
should set itself the task of reconceptualising new rights in such a way as to
reveal, rather than conceal their origin in women’s distinctive existential and
material state of being.
In the second part, this discussion was translated into the debate of international
refugee law on how to include gender-based violence into the grounds of
persecution, as gender was omitted when the Refugee Convention was created
in 1951. Some argue that gender-based persecution should be interpreted into
the already existing grounds, i.e. race, religion, nationality, member of a
particular social group or political opinion. They say that it is not the omission of
gender as a ground for persecution that is the problem. Instead, they argue that
the problem is that women’s experiences have been interpreted as to not fit into
the existing categories and it is, therefore, the interpretations of these grounds
that need to change. The UNHCR and the European Parliament have argued
that gender-based persecution should be subsumed under the ground of being
member of a particular social group. Some have advocated that resistance to
conform with gendered norms and customs should be classified as a political
opinion. Yet, others have argued that where gender is the discrete basis of
persecution, it is critical that it is named as such, since one would otherwise
mask the specificity of women’s oppression. This paper has argued for the latter
position.
The third and last part of this paper examined the Swedish example, where
gender-based persecution was introduced as a new concept in the Aliens Act in
1997. This was a new concept in that it for the first time named gender as a
ground of persecution, but also as it may be seen as a step aside from
symmetrical vision that has traditionally been the basis for Swedish legislation.
Unfortunately, the new gender clause suffered from a number of defects which
have hampered its significance and implementation. The most important defect
is that it does not give the applicant the same protection as that given to an
applicant who is granted a residence permit on the grounds listed in the Refugee
Convention or under risk of torture. Also, the lack of research into the notion of
gender-based persecution and its dynamics in the preparatory work has paved
the way for a misunderstanding of the term “kön” in the implementation of the
clause. It has, however, also been stressed that, as the official Swedish policy
recognises the imbalance of power between the sexes on a domestic level, the
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same recognition should characterize its relationship with aliens, i.e. refugees.
Thus, it is important to name gender-based persecution for what it is, but its
status should be strengthened and equalised with the five grounds already
mentioned in the Refugee Convention.
As the journalist Linda Hossie criticises the Canadian gender guidelines, she
also eloquently formulates the argumentation in favour of explicitly enumerating
gender among the grounds for asylum:
“The problem with the draft guidelines, meanwhile, is that they treat
women’s refugee problems as a subtle variation of men’s. But the
situation of women is unique. Forced abortion, forced pregnancy,
ritual and (disabling) clitoridectomy – all of which are appallingly
common – are forms of persecution that have no parallel in men’s
experience. To oblige women seeking asylum to prove that such
treatment is just a variation of the oppression faced by men is
illogical and – when you get right down to it – discriminatory. Even
when women face routine political, religious or ethnic persecution, it
is compounded by their almost universal second-class status.
Women draw the ire of sexist cultures much more readily than do
men, and for much less provocative actions.”178
There may be a fear among some, that strengthening the protection for gender-
based persecution might result in floods of new asylum seekers. The reality is
that permanent resettlement or asylum in a remote country will never be a viable
or even desirable option for the overwhelming majority of displaced women. As
the refugee scholar James Hathaway has stated “We are not going to see a
flood of female claimants. Most women can’t get out of their countries, and
when they can, they’re lucky to make it to the next country”.179 For many
women, however, the ability to remain outside their homeland and to find refuge
is of crucial importance, as forced return can mean persecution in the form of
abuse, extreme ridicule, ostracism, and even death.
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